What kind of evidence is it that Evidence-Based Medicine advocates want health care providers and consumers to pay attention to? by Haynes, R Brian
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Health Services Research
BMC Health Services Research  2002,  2 Debate
What kind of evidence is it that Evidence-Based Medicine advocates 
want health care providers and consumers to pay attention to?
R Brian Haynes
Address: Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
E-mail: bhaynes@mcmaster.ca
Abstract
Background: In 1992, Evidence-Based Medicine advocates proclaimed a "new paradigm", in which
evidence from health care research is the best basis for decisions for individual patients and health
systems. Hailed in New York Times Magazine in 2001 as one of the most influential ideas of the
year, this approach was initially and provocatively pitted against the traditional teaching of medicine,
in which the key elements of knowing for clinical purposes are understanding of basic
pathophysiologic mechanisms of disease coupled with clinical experience. This paper reviews the
origins, aspirations, philosophical limitations, and practical challenges of evidence-based medicine.
Discussion: EBM has long since evolved beyond its initial (mis)conception, that EBM might replace
traditional medicine. EBM is now attempting to augment rather than replace individual clinical
experience and understanding of basic disease mechanisms. EBM must continue to evolve,
however, to address a number of issues including scientific underpinnings, moral stance and
consequences, and practical matters of dissemination and application. For example, accelerating the
transfer of research findings into clinical practice is often based on incomplete evidence from
selected groups of people, who experience a marginal benefit from an expensive technology, raising
issues of the generalizability of the findings, and increasing problems with how many and who can
afford the new innovations in care.
Summary: Advocates of evidence-based medicine want clinicians and consumers to pay attention
to the best findings from health care research that are both valid and ready for clinical application.
Much remains to be done to reach this goal.
Background
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is based on the notion
that clinicians, if they are to provide, and continue to pro-
vide, optimal care for their patients, need to know enough
about applied research principles to detect studies pub-
lished in the medical literature that are both scientifically
strong and ready for clinical application. This opportunity
for continuing to improve the quality of medical care
stems from the huge ongoing public and private invest-
ment in biomedical and health research.
The challenges in applying new knowledge, however, are
considerable, and EBM does not address them all. Two
that EBM tries to address are as follows. First, the advance
of knowledge is incremental, with many false steps, and
with breakthroughs few and far between, so that only a
very tiny fraction of the reports in the medical literature
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signal new knowledge that is both adequately tested and
important enough for practitioners to depend upon and
apply. Second, practitioners have limited time and little
understanding of research methods.
To help practitioners meet these challenges, EBM advo-
cates have created procedures to objectively identify and
summarize evidence as it accumulates on clinical topics,
and resources that allow users to find the current best evi-
dence when and where it is needed for decisions concern-
ing health and health care [1]. This paper reviews the
origins, aspirations, philosophical limitations, and practi-
cal challenges of evidence-based medicine.
Discussion
The history and precepts of EBM
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), the term and current
concepts, originated from clinical epidemiologists at Mc-
Master University [2,3]. Although the term has been
adopted by many disciplines and adapted to their use (eg,
as Evidence-Based Nursing, Evidence-Based Clinical Prac-
tice, Evidence-Based Pharmacy, and so on), the objectives
of these congeners are the same and I will use the generic
term in this essay.
EBM advocates want patients, practitioners, health care
managers and policy makers to pay attention to the best
findings from health care research that meet the dual re-
quirements of being both scientifically valid and ready for
clinical application.
In doing so, EBM advocates proclaimed a new paradigm
and seemingly pitted EBM against the traditional knowl-
edge foundation of medicine, in which the key elements
are understanding of basic mechanisms of disease cou-
pled with clinical experience. The latter is epitomized by
the individual authority ("expert"), or, better still, collec-
tive medical authority, such as a panel of experts con-
vened by a professional society to provide practice
guidelines based on collective expert opinion. EBM claims
that experts are more fallible in their recommendations
(of what works and what doesn't work in caring for pa-
tients) than evidence derived from sound systematic ob-
servation (that is, health care research). This is especially
so during recent decades when applied research methods
have been developed for observation and experimenta-
tion in increasingly naturalistic and complex clinical set-
tings.
Furthermore, because applied research methods are based
on assessing probabilities for relationships and the effects
of interventions, rather than underlying mechanistic ex-
planations, EBM posits that practitioners must be ready to
accept and deal with uncertainty (rather than seeking the
reductionist allure of basic science), and to acknowledge
that management decisions are often made in the face of
relative ignorance of their underlying nature or true im-
pact for individual patients.
A fundamental assumption of EBM is that practitioners
whose practice is based on an understanding of evidence
from applied health care research will provide superior
patient care compared with practitioners who rely on un-
derstanding of basic mechanisms and their own clinical
experience. So far, no convincing direct evidence exists
that shows that this assumption is correct. Nevertheless,
the New York Times Magazine "Year in Review" included
EBM as one of the most influential ideas of 2001 [4].
Basic versus applied health research
Scientific approaches to studying health care problems de-
veloped at a leisurely pace until the end of World War II
when some of the public funding that had been dedicated
to killing was reallocated to saving lives through health re-
search. Initial investments were directed firstly to basic re-
search, to better understand the determinants and
pathophysiology of disease, and medical schools reflected
this stage of development in their teaching of the basic sci-
ences of biology, pathology, physiology and biochemis-
try, as the foundation of medical knowledge. Increasing
shares of investment were then allocated to the develop-
ment and applied testing of innovations in clinical set-
tings. Although these applied research methods were
initially rooted in the observational techniques of epide-
miology, clinical epidemiologists such as Archie Co-
chrane in the UK, Alvan Feinstein in the US, and David
Sackett in Canada, pioneered and legitimized the use of
experimentation in clinical settings, leading to the rand-
omized controlled trial becoming the hallmark of testing.
It is important to recognize that experimental designs
were added to observational designs, not substituted for
them. Different methods, observational or experimental,
are needed for exploring different questions.
The first trial in which randomization was formally de-
scribed and applied was published in the British Medical
Journal in 1948 [5] and heralded a new era of antibiotic
treatment, streptomycin for tuberculosis. Today, method-
ologies from other scientific disciplines have been added.
For example, nonexperimental and qualitative research
methods have been adopted from the social sciences.
Thus, the research methods of medical science are plural-
istic and expanding, driven by attempts to address a
broader range of questions, and undoubtedly by the pri-
ority that people place on personal health, the obvious
benefits that biomedical research has already brought,
and the prospect that these benefits are just the beginning.
EBM does not clearly address the role of basic science in
medical discovery, except to indicate that, in most circum-BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/3
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stances of relevance to individual patient care, basic sci-
ence alone does not provide valid and practical guidance.
There are some exceptions: certain deficiency disorders,
such as type 1 diabetes mellitus, for example. However,
even though basic science provides definitive evidence
that insulin deficiency is the underlying problem in this
disorder, determining which of many possible ways of de-
livering exogenous insulin therapy results in the best care
for patients has required myriads of applied research stud-
ies, with clear evidence concerning the benefit of multiple
dose insulin regimens coming less than a decade ago [6].
In many such situations, empirical solutions, tested by ap-
plied research methods, are "holding the fort" until basic
understanding – of mechanisms and interventions – is
forthcoming. This will continue to be the case for the fore-
seeable future, the marvelous advances in genomics not-
withstanding.
This schism between basic and applied research is, howev-
er, more rhetoric than reality. Rather, basic and applied re-
search are different ends of a spectrum of health research,
progressing from "bench" to "bedside". The best applied
research studies are often founded on excellent basic sci-
ence findings, even if basic research is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the management of most medical prob-
lems. This is because applied research is a complementary
way of knowing, not a participant in a scientific turf war
competing to be the best way of knowing. Nevertheless,
from a pragmatic, clinical focus, applied research provides
evidence to practitioners and patients that is often better
suited for the specific problems they must deal with. Con-
fusion between the objectives of science and those of the
practice of medicine has perhaps led to much of the mis-
understanding and criticism leveled at EBM.
An example of the interplay between basic and applied 
clinical research
An example illustrates the complex relationship between
basic and applied research, and in turn, between both of
these and clinical practice. Narrowing of the arteries to the
front part of the brain (the internal carotid artery and its
tributaries, the anterior and middle cerebral arteries) is as-
sociated with stroke, in which a part of the brain dies
when it loses its blood supply. Narrowings of the internal
carotid artery above the level of the neck can be bypassed
through connecting the superficial temporal artery (STA),
on the outside of the head, with a branch of the middle
cerebral artery (MCA), just inside the skull. STA-MCA by-
pass (also known as extracranial-intracranial (EC/IC) by-
pass) is an elegant (and expensive) surgical procedure that
is both technically feasible in a high proportion of cases
and leads to increased blood supply to the part of the
brain beyond the narrowing of the ICA. This increased
blood supply was thought, on physiological grounds, to
be exactly what the brain needed to prevent future strokes
in people who had had minor strokes in this vascular dis-
tribution.
About 200 reports of case series of patients undergoing
STA-MCA bypass were reported in the medical literature
up to 1985, almost all of them interpreted by their sur-
geon authors as indicating benefits for patients. In these
case series studies, patients are described before and after
undergoing the procedure, and sometimes compared with
findings in previous reports ("historical controls"), with
and without the procedure. In 1985, a large randomized
controlled trial was reported [7]. This showed no reduc-
tion in the subsequent rate of stroke with the procedure
when compared with the rate for patients who did not
have the procedure. On further analysis, it was found that
patients with STA-MCA bypass who had higher rates of
blood flow were actually worse off, and that surgery blunt-
ed the natural rate of recovery from the initial stroke that
led to selection of patients for surgery [8]. Dissemination
of these findings was rapid and led to the elimination of
this procedure for attempting to prevent stroke recurrence.
Subsequently, randomized controlled trials were conduct-
ed for patients with narrowing of the internal carotid ar-
tery in the neck. Removing this narrowing surgically, a
procedure called carotid endarterectomy, had been prac-
ticed for longer than STA-MCA bypass at the time but had
not been adequately tested in controlled trials. Its use was
brought into question because of the negative findings of
the STA-MCA bypass trial, which appeared to undermine
the physiological rationale for the procedure, namely, that
opening a partially blocked internal carotid artery would
reduce the risk for subsequent stroke. As it happens, sever-
al randomized controlled trials of carotid endarterectomy
that ensued showed that it has substantial benefit for
symptomatic patients with severe narrowing of the carotid
artery, but not for those who had mild narrowing or who
had no symptoms associated with the narrowing [9].
These trials of STA-MCA bypass and carotid endarterecto-
my have led to better understanding of the basic mecha-
nisms of stroke, elimination of a harmful surgical
procedure, promotion of another procedure, and provi-
sion of evidence for tailoring the findings to individual
patients [10]. These advances in knowledge have benefit-
ed many patients. Unfortunately, surveys of patient care
also show that some patients receive endarterectomy
when they are unlikely to benefit from it, while others
who might benefit are not offered it [11]. In fact, there are
numerous examples of underapplied evidence of both the
benefits and harms of treatments [12]. Eliminating this
mismatch between who could benefit and who is offered
health care interventions is the prime objective of EBM.BMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/3
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The nuts and bolts of EBM
A current definition of EBM is "the explicit, judicious, and
conscientious use of current best evidence from health
care research in decisions about the care of individuals
and populations" [1]. A more pragmatic definition is a set
of tools and resources for finding and applying current
best evidence from research for the care of individual pa-
tients. This practical definition reflects the fact that there
are now many information resources in which evidence
from health care research has been pre-graded for validity
by people with expertise in research methods, and, better
still, also assessed by experienced practitioners for clinical
relevance. Thus, the user's task is changing from the large-
ly hopeless one of reading the original medical literature
to find out about current best care, to one of finding the
right pre-assessed research evidence, judging whether it
applies to the health problem at hand, and then working
the evidence into the decision that must be made.
Grades of the quality of evidence are derived from scien-
tific principles of epidemiology and its offspring, clinical
epidemiology. The grades are based on several notions,
the most elementary of which are as follows. First, studies
that take more precautions to minimize the risk of bias
(for example, through using reliable and valid measures
of health care outcomes) are more likely to reveal useful
truths than those that take fewer precautions. Second,
studies based in patient populations that more closely re-
semble those that exist in usual clinical practice are more
likely to provide valid and useful information for clinical
practice than studies based on organisms in test tubes,
creatures in cages, very select human populations, or
unachievable clinical circumstances (such as extra staff to
provide intensive follow up, far beyond the resources in
usual clinical settings). Third, studies that measure clinical
outcomes that are more important to patients (eg, mortal-
ity, morbidity and quality of life, rather than liver en-
zymes and serum electrolytes) are more likely to provide
evidence that is important to both practitioners and pa-
tients.
Simple guidelines for critical appraisal of health care re-
search evidence are widely available in print [for example,
[1,13]] and on the internet (for example,  [http://
www.cche.net/usersguides/main.asp] ). Optimal study
designs differ for determining the cause, course, diagnosis,
prognosis, prevention, therapy and rehabilitation of dis-
ease, so the rules for assessing validity differ for these dif-
ferent questions. For example, randomized allocation of
participants to an intervention and control group is held
to be better than non-random allocation for controlling
bias in intervention studies. This is not merely a matter of
logic, common sense or faith: non-random allocation
usually results in more optimistic differences between in-
tervention and control groups than does random alloca-
tion [14]. Similarly, in observational study designs for
assessing the accuracy of diagnostic tests, independent in-
terpretation of the tests that are being compared is known
to result in less optimistic reports of test performance
[15].
Although most guidelines for critical appraisal are not
comprehensive or fully rigorous, they provide an effective
filter for the reliability and validity of health care research
that screens out about 98% or more of the medical re-
search literature as not being ready for clinical use [16]. Of
those studies that make it through the filter, systematic re-
views provide the firmest base for the application of evi-
dence in practice [17]; the past decade has seen the
Cochrane Collaboration forging a world wide effort to
summarize evidence concerning the effects of health care
interventions [18].
Once individual studies have been assembled and graded
for quality, the collected evidence then can be used to
make recommendations for practice, preferably with each
recommendation being labeled according to the level of
evidence that supports it. Various systems for indicating
the level of evidence for collected evidence are available,
for example, from the Centre for Evidence-Based Medi-
cine in Oxford  [http://cebm.jr2.ox.ac.uk/docs/lev-
els.html]  and in EBM books [1,13].
Some difficulties with the term Evidence-Based Medicine
Many objections to EBM are based on the notion that it
advocates cook-book medicine, that is, treating patients
strictly according to a formula or algorithm derived from
a research study. In fact, this was never intended by the ad-
vocates of EBM, but it was perhaps not initially clearly em-
phasized that evidence from research can be no more than
one component of any clinical decision. Other key com-
ponents are the circumstances of the patient (as assessed
through the expertise of the clinician), and the preferences
of the patient (Figure 1) [19]. Just how research evidence,
clinical circumstances, and patients' wishes are to be com-
bined to derive an optimal decision has not been clearly
stated, except that "clinical judgment and expertise" are
viewed as essential to success [20].
Even more problematic, the term evidence is commonly
used for many types of evidence of relevance to clinical
practice, not just health care research evidence. For exam-
ple, clinicians collect evidence of patients' circumstances
and wishes. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the term evi-
dence-based medicine is confusing to many, who do not
appreciate that its evidence is narrowly defined as having
to do with systematic observations from certain types of
research. The very name has been an impediment to get-
ting across its main objective, namely, that health care re-
search is nowadays producing important results that, ifBMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/3
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applied, can benefit patients more than the treatments
that clinicians are experienced in recommending. Using
the technical definition of EBM, evidence from heath care
research is a modern, never-before-available complement
to traditional medicine. Perhaps a better name would be
"certain-types-of-high-quality-and-clinically-relevant-evi-
dence-from-health-care-research-in-support-of-health-
care-decision-making"...an accurate but mind-numbing
descriptor.
Philosophical issues – from a lay perspective
The main original paper on EBM [2] proposed EBM as a
paradigm shift, based on Thomas Kuhn's definition of
paradigms: ways of looking at the world that define both
the problems that can be legitimately addressed and the
range of admissible evidence that may bear on their solu-
tion. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that not very much at-
tention was paid by the originators of EBM to the
philosophy of science. It is also easy to agree with Alan
Chalmers [21] that most scientists and EBM advocates are
ignorant of the philosophy of science and give little or no
thought to constructing a philosophical basis for their ac-
tivities.
According to Guba and Lincoln [22], in the basic science
that underpins traditional medicine, the workings of the
human body and basic mechanisms of disease can be dis-
covered by observations of an individual human or organ-
ism using instruments that are objective and bias free.
These mechanisms then can be discerned by inductive
logic and known to a certainty. By contrast, applied re-
search deals with more complex phenomena than disease
mechanisms; often relies on experimentation rather than
(just) observation; recognizes that observations of com-
plex phenomena can be biased and takes measures to re-
duce bias; has groups of patients as the basis of
observation; uses probabilities to judge truth, rather than
expecting certainty; and uses deductive and Bayesian logic
to progress. Certainly, there are differences between the
approaches of basic and applied research, but are they
mutually exclusive, as in a paradigm shift, or complemen-
tary ways of knowing, as in a pluralistic version of episte-
mology? The latter view seems to be more tenable.
The expectation of EBM that doctors should keep abreast
of evidence from (certain-types-of-health-care-) research
raises many issues. First, what is "valid" health care re-
search? Second, what are the "best" findings from this re-
search? Third, whe n is health care  research "ready" f or
application? Fourth and fifth, to whom and how does one
apply valid and ready evidence from health care research?
EBM provides a set of increasingly sophisticated tools for
addressing these questions, but, at present, the result is
only partly as good as EBM advocates hope it will become.
Meanwhile there is much to criticise about EBM from
both philosophical (AV Kulkarni, personal communica-
tion, 2000) and practical perspectives. For example, it is
difficult to be smug about the superiority of the research
methods advocated by EBM when the results of studies
that are similar methodologically not infrequently disa-
gree with one another. Meanwhile, it has been shown that
the findings of observational studies agree more often
than not with the findings of allegedly more potent RCTs
[23,24]. While holes can be picked in these arguments
against the ascendancy of RCTs [25], there is no way to
win the argument without a universal standard of truth.
Furthermore, the issue of when a research finding is ready
for clinical application remains mired in the lack of a sat-
isfactory resolution of how findings from groups can be
applied to individuals. For one thing, our understanding
of how to determine what patients want is primitive. Also
problematic, the circumstances in which patients are treat-
ed can vary widely from location to location (including
locations that are right across the street from one anoth-
er): the resources, expertise and patients are often quite
different and the same research evidence cannot be ap-
plied in the same way, or not at all.
Finally, we do not have convincing studies showing that
patients whose clinicians practise EBM are better off than
those whose clinicians do not practise EBM: no one has
done a randomized controlled trial of EBM with patient
outcomes as the measure of success. Such a trial would be
Figure 1
Basic elements of clinical decision makingBMC Health Services Research 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/3
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impossible to do as the control group could not be effec-
tively isolated from the research that EBM is attempting to
transfer, and it would be regarded as unethical to attempt
to do so. This situation is unfortunate in the sense that,
even if it is accepted that current research is generating val-
uable findings for health care, there are many questions
about whether the EBM movement is doing anything use-
ful to accelerate the transfer of these findings into practice.
Nevertheless, we do have limited evidence that the con-
cepts of EBM are teachable [26].
David Hume and his followers took pains to point out the
differences between is and ought. The is of EBM is that sci-
ence is producing new and better ways of predicting, de-
tecting and treating disease than were imaginable at the
middle of the past century. The ought of the EBM move-
ment, which annoys many practitioners, and would per-
turb Hume and his followers, is that EBM advocates
believe that clinicians ought to be responsible for keeping
up to date with these advances and ought to be prepared
to offer them to patients. Thus, EBM has taken on the
tones of a moral imperative. But it is premature to get very
preachy about the ought of EBM, not that this has stopped
EBM's more ardent advocates.
Worse still, the interventions that advocates of EBM insist
ought to be provided in all appropriate individual circum-
stances would undoubtedly have some important adverse
effects. For one, full implementation would cost much
more than the resources currently available for health
care, even accounting for some cost effective innovations
and deletion of existing but ineffective practices. The in-
creased costs of care would lead to unaddressed (let alone
resolved) dilemmas in distributive justice. Second, inter-
ventions that save lives and reduce suffering in the short
term may end up prolonging life beyond the point of se-
nescence and misery.
EBM advocates try to ameliorate the latter problem by de-
claring that patients' values ought to be incorporated into
clinical decisions, but without assuring that we know how
to do this. Indeed, there is a continuing tension here be-
tween the consequentialist, population-based origins of
epidemiology (doing the greatest good for the greatest
number), which generates most of the best evidence that
EBM advocates hope to convince practitioners and pa-
tients to pay attention to, and the deontological or indi-
vidualistic approach of medicine, doing the greatest good
for the individual patient, which practitioners are sworn
to do. Although some components of EBM have been de-
rided as representing ultrapragmatic utilitarianism, EBM
doesn't offer a credible solution to this tension, nor even
take a clear stance on it, perhaps reflecting the dual origins
of many EBM advocates: most of the leaders are trained in
both epidemiology and a clinical discipline, and do both
research and clinical practice.
In weighing the philosophical issues raised by EBM, many
epistemological issues certainly merit intense discussion.
However, it is the ethical issues that I believe to be of high-
est concern. Will the proceeds of the new science of med-
icine be fairly distributed in society? Given the already
stupendous and wildly escalating costs of health care,
driven particularly by newer diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions, how can resources be optimally and fairly
allocated within the health care sector and across all sec-
tors of public expenditure? Can the long-term conse-
quences (for example, unproductive and miserable
longevity) of the short-term gains that are regularly docu-
mented by health care research continue to be ignored?
How can patient's wishes be informed, determined and
taken into account in health care decision making?
Should some of the funds for health research be diverted
into some other sector (continuing education?) so that
the health care system can catch up to the current state of
knowledge? Is EBM a waste of time if we lack adequate un-
derstanding of practical methods of changing practitioner
and patient actions [27]?
One hopes that the attention of philosophers will be
drawn to these questions, as well as to the continuing de-
bate about whether EBM is a new paradigm and whether
applied health care research findings are more valid for
reaching practical decisions about health care than basic
pathophysiological mechanisms and the unsystematic
observations of practitioners.
Summary
Evidence-Based Medicine has evolved substantially from
its origins a decade ago, becoming less pretentious and
more practical. Nonetheless, it must continue to evolve
and address several important issues that will otherwise
limit its value as an adjunct to health care decisions. Press-
ing matters include agreement on what constitutes "best"
evidence; appropriate generalization beyond research
projects; accurate and efficient communication with prac-
titioners, patients and policy makers; and moral issues in-
cluding distributive justice and individual autonomy.
Given the substantial investment of society and com-
merce in fundamental and applied health research, and
the high expectations of society for reducing the burden of
illness, attention to these matters should have high prior-
ity.
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